Money Has No Smell by Peterecz, Zoltán
273 
Money Has No Smell: Anti-Semitism in Hungary 
and the Anglo-Saxon World, and the  
Launching of the International Reconstruction 
Loan for Hungary in 1924. 
Zoltán Peterecz 
Introduction 
Today, anti-Semitism is a recurring phenomenon in Europe. This is 
somewhat strange if one takes into consideration the suffering of this 
people during World War II and the staggering number of Jews murdered 
during the Holocaust, a fact that is well known to everyone and 
commemorated in every year on given days. Despite of this, there are 
always those who deny the Holocaust publicly and, in doing so, they 
encourage the uneducated layers that often had an anti-Semitic 
upbringing. Still, before World War II, anti-Semitism was very much an 
everyday feature not restricted to much of Europe and Great Britain but 
also in the United States. It was true not only for those coming from 
strongly devout families where anti-Semitism was a doctrine deeply 
seated in the religious teachings, but also for the well-educated upper 
classes. Although this layer was also affected by Protestant or Catholic 
teachings, their experience on account of their regular travels to toher 
parts of the world and contact to various elements of society, their 
worldview could and should have been changed but was not. This article 
first examines the nature of anti-Semitism in Hungary, Great Britain, and 
the United States, then it will present the case study of the launching of 
the Hungarian reconstruction loan in 1924, which was interwoven with 
clear manifestations of anti-Semitism. 
In 1924, Hungary was the recipient of an international loan as the 
main part of the financial reconstruction launched and overseen by the 
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League of Nations. This undertaking in the name of rehabilitating Central 
and Eastern Europe had its political underpinnings. After the various 
peace treaties, the defeated and punished countries tried to find their place 
in the sun both in diplomatic and economic senses. Austria, where the 
first League-administered reconstruction took place in late 1922, 
Hungary, which was the most severely punished country after World War 
I, and Germany, where the Dawes Plan was launched in the fall of 1924, 
in a largely similar fashion to that of Austria and Hungary, all felt 
resentment if not outright hatred against France. They saw their draconian 
punishment as a result of French efforts. Hungary had all the more reason 
to resent France, because the Little Entente, an alliance of the successor 
states, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, 
had an open anti-Hungarian agenda with French backing. Therefore, it is 
no wonder that all these states in dire straits were seeking Anglo-Saxon 
help. While they hoped to find some diplomatic backing from Great 
Britain, a well-known opponent of France, in the financial field these 
countries put their faith first and foremost in the United States and, to a 
lesser degree, into Great Britain. In the case of Hungary, in both the 
diplomatic and financial fields, it was equally important to ensure the 
support of these Anglo-Saxon powers. 
Anti-Semitism in Hungary 
In Hungary, Jews had been on the scene for centuries in small 
numbers. Their quantity started to grow in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The Jewish diaspora accounted for less than 4% of 
Hungary in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; by the eve of World War I, 
this figure rose to 6%. Although there were seldom atrocities against 
them, it can be said that Jews lived in relative peace but not in popularity. 
Since they took up liberal professions (such as private medical doctors, 
lawyers, journalists, merchants, and businessmen) that many coming form 
middle and upper middle classes found demeaning, and some of the 
Jewish families became wealthy, they were an easy prey of the 
aforementioned layers, and jealousy soon turned into common dislike and 
sometimes into outright hatred. The Hungarian Jewry, especially in the 
large cities, deemed it extremely important that their children have a good 
education. They made use of the positive changes in the field of education 
in Hungary, which started to achieve a high standard. On the highest level 
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of education, the proportion of Jewish students was way above their 
ethnic ratio compared to the whole of Hungary.  
World War I and its aftermath changed many things. One of them 
was that the general dislike against Jews turned into broad loathing. One 
of the reasons for this was the Hungarian Soviet Republic in the spring of 
1919. Since many of the Bolshevik commissars were of Jewish origins, 
the backlash after the fall of this regime hit the whole Jewish group in 
Hungary hard. The fact that most of the participants in the Bolshevist 
coup and regime were poor Jewish immigrants from Galicia and not the 
traditional “Hungarian” Jews did not seem to bother the majority. In the 
wake of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, in which Hungary was rendered a 
small country shorn of two-thirds of its territories and population, the 
Jews became an easy target to blame. The Jewish people were looked 
upon as a scapegoat, which the ruling conservative side, and the country’s 
population in general, needed and found in them. The Jews were an easy 
mark. They had accumulated great wealth in the past few decades and via 
that money, most of which was accrued in the banking sphere, some of 
them became accepted in the highest circles. Still, Jews could never attain 
true Hungarian nationality in the eyes of many, and for a lot of 
Hungarians they were anathema. As the historian Tibor Frank notes, it 
was not only the political events that evoked such sentiment, since the 
“Jewish question [was] deeply embedded in early twentieth-century 
Hungarian society.”1 It was especially the right wing elements in the 
country that wished for a stricter anti-Jewish agenda, and even the 
expulsion of the Jews was acceptable for them as well. 
The first and most spectacular manifestation of such feelings took 
place already in 1919. During the White Terror following the Hungarian 
Soviet Republic, Jews were usual victims. In the words of the historians 
Yehuda Don and George Magos, anti-Semitism in Hungary turned “ into 
a bigoted savage movement during the first months of the ‘White Terror,’ 
as of August 1919, [and] antisemitic outbursts became an immediate 
danger for Jewish existence, and were followed by an unprecedented 
wave of conversions.”2 There were sporadic explosions of violent anti-
Semitist actions in the coming years. In April 1922, nine Jews were killed 
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and twenty-three injured in a bomb explosion in Budapest at a club 
attended mostly by Jews. Although in this case the offenders were legally 
punished, it was not always the case. One of the most famous ones was 
the attack in Csongrád, where a bomb was thrown into a ball room on 
December 26, 1923, where Jews were celebrating. In the wake of the 
explosion, three people died and many suffered serious injuries. Despite 
the fact that the suspected members of a far right group admitted their 
guilt, they were acquitted later on.
3
 
Aside from sporadic physical atrocities, the anti-Semitic sentiment 
was manifest in the infamous Numerus Clausus Act, which regulated the 
percentage of Jewish students that were allowed into the highest 
educational facilities. The bill declared that the ethnic ratio among 
university students must correspond to their ratio in the population, but 
obviously, the clear goal of the law was to limit the numbers of Jews 
studying in the highest education, for the gain of the Christian middle 
class.
4
 Before and immediately after 1918, the ratio of Jewish students was 
well above 30%; the new legal ratio was 6% for them, but it was not strictly 
followed, and their percentage in the highest education was around 9%, still 
a very sharp decrease.
5
 This Act, the first of its kind, did not help postwar 
Hungary to get out of its political isolation. The League of Nations put on 
its agenda the question twice in the first half of the 1920s, once on the 
petition of Hungarian Jews, but it did not lead to any drastic steps.
6
 
In any case, the ruling legal and common environment made many 
Jewish intellectuals decide in favor of leaving Hungary. Among such 
scientists who later became world famous were Theodore von Kármán, 
John von Neumann, Leo Szilard, Eugene Wigner, and Edward Teller. 
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Although they all started their studies in Hungary and came from the 
upper middle class, in order to fulfill their scientific hunger and eschew 
repression at home, they needed to leave their home country. Probably 
many more Jewish persons would have chosen immigration, but with the 
quota laws in the United States in the first half of he 1920s, there were 
only precious few who could get entry visa to the U.S. The two Quota 
Acts of 1921 and 1924, and their effect on Central European, and more 
precisely, on Hungarian immigration were significant. Hungary, which 
contributed about 100,000 immigrants per year before World War I, was 
now restricted to 5,747 in 1921, then to a mere 473 in 1924, a figure that 
was equal to 2% of their representation based upon the 1890 US Bureau 
Census, and even a two-fold increase in 1924 did not alter this situation 
significantly.
7
 
Anti-Semitism in Great Britain 
In Great Britain anti-Semitism had also had a long history, although 
it was different and far from the Hungarian type. British anti-Semitism 
was many times a manifestation of anti-alienism. Such newspapers as the 
Pall Mall Gazette did everything to entice readers against what they saw 
an engulfment by Jews. The well-established Jewish community, for 
instance, did everything to make the poor Eastern European Jews turn 
back in order to avoid anti-Semitic backlash against their status already 
earned in England
8
. Two momentous events are worth mentioning 
concerning the Jewish question, both happening at around the same time. 
During World War I, the question of loyalty was high on the political 
agenda, and suspicions against aliens grew. Since many Jews had arrived 
from Germany, the war was a good occasion to force many Jewish 
citizens to declare their loyalty toward their chosen country. Another act 
stemming from the war effort took place in November 1917, when His 
Majesty’s government issued the Balfour Declaration, which basically 
promised “a National Home for the Jewish People.” This seemingly 
liberal political declaration had more to do with present war efforts. Lloyd 
George later admitted that the main goal was to gain Jewish sympathies 
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and the significant Jewish financial support world wide it might mean for 
the Entente.
9
 It is more probable, however, that the main purpose of the 
declaration, which was received with positive feedback from the United 
States to Russia, was to insure that Britain enjoyed friendly feelings in 
Palestine and among the Jews in general, which was the British 
diplomatic goal in the Near East.
10
  
The other defining event was the Russian Revolution, which was 
soon was depicted in Britain as a Jewish conspiracy.
11
 The menacing 
Bolshevik tide that seemed at moments to engulf some of the defeated 
countries, and, therefore, to endanger the possibility of the stability 
dreamed by the Western Powers, easily created a chance to cry out 
against both Bolshevism and the Jews. As Winston Churchill wrote, in the 
Russian Revolution “the majority of the leading figures are Jews. 
Moreover, the principal inspiration and driving power comes from the 
Jewish leaders.”12 The future prime minister thought that conversion to 
Zionism was a much better outcome for a Jew, and for Great Britain and 
the new world order, than to become a convert of Bolshevism. He made 
clear to every reader where the danger lay: 
In the Soviet institutions the predominance of Jews is even more 
astonishing. And the prominent, if not indeed the principal, part in the 
system of terrorism applied by the Extraordinary Commissions for 
Combating Counter-Revolution has been taken by Jews, and in some 
notable cases by Jewesses. The same evil prominence was obtained by 
Jews in the brief period of terror during which Bela Kun ruled in 
Hungary. The same phenomenon has been presented in Germany 
(especially in Bavaria), so far as this madness has been allowed to prey 
upon the temporary prostration of the German people. Although in all 
these countries there are many non-Jews every whit as bad as the worst 
of the Jewish revolutionaries, the part played by the latter in proportion 
to their numbers in the population is astonishing.
13
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Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary between 1919 and 1924, used 
similarly harsh words when he depicted Jews taking part in the leadership 
of the Soviet government as “a small gang… who are preying like 
vultures on the bodies of that unhappy [Russian] people.”14 Harold 
Nicolson’s, another decisive person in the Foreign Office, confession is 
illuminating as well: “The Jewish capacity for destruction is really 
illimitable. Although I loathe anti-Semitism, I do dislike Jews.”15 But it 
was not only the political and diplomatic elite that harbored such 
sentiment. If nursery rhymes are a in any way a measure of popular 
feelings, the following lines are telling much about long-standing popular 
sentiment toward Jews, on both sides of the Atlantic: 
Jack sold his gold egg 
To a rascally Jew, 
Who cheated him out of 
The half of his due. 
 
The Jew got the goose 
Which he vowed he would kill, 
Resolving at once 
His pockets to fill.
16
  
 
Both in the higher political circles and among common people, anti-
Semitism was an everyday feature. 
Anti-Semitism in the United States 
In the United States, anti-Semitism was on a lower scale than in in 
Europe. It was mainly due to the more liberal relation to newcomers and 
aliens as such. A country made of immigrants, it was little wonder that an 
ethnic or religious minority can have a more secure environment. Still, the 
dominant creed was that of the Protestant members of the society and 
they had a deeply grained dislike against Jews mainly on account of their 
religious teachings. The many Catholic immigrants arriving throughout 
the nineteenth century only added to this general feeling. So, when poor 
Jews arrived in large numbers during the period lasting roughly 1880 to 
World War I, anti-Semitism gained ground, similarly to Great Britian, as 
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part of anti-alienism. Still, since Jewish people arrived from all over 
Southern, Eastern, and Central Europe, the antipathy against them was 
stronger than to any one nation. Among the upper class, the national elite 
so to speak, anti-Semitism was a typical feature, but not necessarily a 
malign thought. It was much more part of a worldview. 
Due to the efforts of the Nativist movement and the political elite, 
toward the end of the nineteenth century the literacy test became to 
symbolize the possibility to exclude the poor immigrants, many of them 
Jews, arriving form Europe. It was thanks only to the various presidents 
that such a bill never became law up until 1917, but the many Jews already 
living in the United States found growing discrimination in other forms: 
they were barred from exclusive clubs and resorts or private schools.
17
 
What really churned up the feelings against Jews, in addition to religious, 
economic, and racial dislike, was the Russian Revolution. The new 
ideology seemed to threaten the American way of life and democratic 
institutions, and since many leaders of the revolution were Jews, Bolshevist 
and Jew became almost synonyms, one fueling the hatred for the other.  
After World War I, the failure of the “American peace” at Paris, and 
the slow but sure consolidation of the Bolshevik rule in Russia, the 
country’s interest definitely turned inward and anti-Semitism became 
fervent. Such printed material such as The Cause of World Unrest, which 
was the American edition of the infamous The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion,
18
 or Henry Ford’s newspaper, The Dearborn Independent from 
1920, only added to the already prevalent anti-Semitism. The very first 
article of Ford’s paper bore the title “The International Jew: The World’s 
Problem,” and claimed on the front page:  
The Jew is the world’s enigma. Poor in his masses, he yet controls the 
world’s finances… The single description which will include a larger 
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percentage of Jews than members of any other race is this: he is in 
business… The Jew is supremely gifted for business… In America alone 
most of the big business… are in the control of Jewish financiers or their 
agents. Jewish journalists are a large and powerful group here… They 
absolutely control the circulations of publications throughout the 
country.
19
  
The periodical must have touched upon a popular nerve, because its 
circulation grew and reached around 700,000 in 1924.
20
 Its success can 
also be attributed to its often quality articles on a score of other issues. In 
the words of one historian, “The International Jew more than any other 
literary source… spread the notion that Jews menaced the United States… 
[and its] perverse accomplishment was to combine the inchoate anti-
Semitism of the Progressive era with the postwar fear of hidden forces.”21 
Anti-Semitism was not restricted to weeklies or books alone, but 
infected higher education as well, in a similar fashion to Hungary. The 
percentage of Jewish students at colleges and universities had multiplied 
in the past decades, which scared many WASP people. As a reaction, 
restrictions were introduced as to how many Jewish undergraduates could 
be enrolled. Ivy League colleges and universities carried the torch for the 
quota system. Dartmouth College introduced a Selective Process in 1921 
to keep Jewish enrollment under control.
22
 Columbia University had a 
huge ratio of Jewish students, 40 percent, but by 1922 the institution had 
managed to cut it back to 22 percent.
23
 The most well-known case took 
place at Harvard University, where President Lawrence A. Lowell 
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fathered an informal quota system on Jewish students. For Harvard, the 22 
percent that Jews represented was frightening in view of their ratio of 
3percent of the whole population. The Harvard Plan of 1923, just as in the 
case of Hungary, did not name the Jews; it only proclaimed that the student 
body should represent the ratio of different races in the country. In both 
cases, such an order went against the Jews.
24
 The real significance was 
Harvard’s prestige and indeed, other famous institutions followed suit, such 
as Princeton, Yale, Duke, Rutgers, Cornell, Johns Hopkins, or Penn State.
25
  
Anti-Semitism and the Loan 
It is important to investigate the raising of the international loan for 
Hungary against the above described background. Hungary was in dire 
straits and it seemed that without outside help there would be no end to 
the ever worsening conditions. The League-initiated Austrian financial 
reconstruction in late 1922 gave a workable scenario for Hungary and the 
League of Nations alike. For Hungary it meant the possibility to put the 
financial house in order and gain absolute legitimacy in and out of 
Europe, while for Great Britain, the major European power in the League 
of Nations, it was a golden chance to further the reconstruction scheme in 
Central Europe. In the early spring of 1924, after protracted negotiations 
that were not free of diplomatic acrimony, Hungary was assured of a 
reconstruction plan on condition that it accepted strict control in the form 
of a Commissioner-General in Hungary. To commence the actual work, a 
$60-million loanhad to be raised in the international financial market. 
Hungarian Prime Minister of the period Count István Bethlen 
pursued a practical realpolitik both in the domestic and foreign political 
arenas, and he dealt with the Jewish question accordingly. Although he 
declared, that “I am against all kinds of noisy anti-Semitism. We will 
under all circumstances make law prevail,” he did nothing to have the 
Numerus Clausus Act repealed.
26
 This was partly attributable to his own, 
somewhat mild, anti-Semitism, and partly to the political necessity of 
preserving the majority in Parliament to be able to govern. In order to 
                                                 
24
 In detail, see, Oliver B. Pollak, “Antisemitism, the Harvard Plan, and the Roots of Rev
erse Discrimination,” Jewish Social Studies 45, no. 2 (Spring, 1983): 113–122.  
25
 Dinnerstein, Anti-Semitism in America, 85–86. 
26
 István Bethlen, Bethlen István gróf beszédei és írásai [The Writings and Speeches of 
Count István Bethlen] vol. 1, (Budapest: Genius Könyvkiadó Rt., 1933), 161.  
283 
achieve his aims, he saw no incompatibility in the fact that his liberal-
conservative Unified Party counted among his members both the openly 
anti-Semitist Gyula Gömbös and his followers, for example, and members 
of the Jewish elite as well. In retrospect, he was walking a fine line when 
he said that he approved of “Christian policies, but these policies should 
not be manifest in anti-Semitism but must be made pro-Christian.”27 For 
Bethlen it was crucial to get the international loan and carry out the 
League of Nations plan, because he saw in it the chance to further 
consolidate his standing. 
The first obstacle to clear was the person of the General-
Commissioner. Aside from other complications, when finally the American 
Jeremiah Smith, Jr. was chosen, his name created confusion and alarm 
among the Hungarian political leadership. Not well versed in New 
England local culture, the Hungarian leaders suspected that Smith might 
be a Jew. Under the ruling Hungarian anti-Semitic sentiment it would 
have been unacceptable to the Bethlen government for a Jew to control 
the country’s finances. Under the ruling domestic circumstances, it would 
have been a political suicide for Bethlen to accept a Jew to the post of 
strict supervision. Only after being convinced that Smith was of no 
Jewish origin did the Hungarians finally approve of his nomination, a fact 
that the British Consul General happily conveyed to London.
28
 
Perhaps it was even of more crucial importance to raise the 
international loan without which there could have been no reconstruction 
the promising plans notwithstanding. The chief problem was that 
Hungary did not seem very a lucrative investment, and since there were 
no state guarantees fo rthe loan as in the case of Austria, central or private 
banks were less reluctant to lend money. The main figure behind the 
whole scheme was Montagu Norman, the powerful Governor of the Bank 
of England. His main goal was to make financial reconstruction in general 
without politicians and he wanted to see it left to the expert bankers of 
which he was one of the most defining. He also believed in central bank 
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cooperation, where the various central banks of the different countries 
could cooperate without any government intervention. Since raising the 
money was not easy, Norman had to take the lion’s share if he wanted to 
achieve his aim. His main purpose was to ensure that the brunt of the 
money came from Great Britain and the United States. 
For some time it seemed that J. P. Morgan & Co. would take a 
larger tranche. Being the leading private bank in the world, its taking part 
in the loan would have automatically ensured that any sum missing would 
be issued in other countries. It was a sobering moment when the 
mammoth banking house in May definitely refused to participate. The 
new National Bank of Hungary was set up and was soon to open, 
therefore it was crucial to secure some American participation. The 
problem, as it turned out, was not the lack of companies willing to come 
in, but the anti-Semitic worldview that some of the involved Anglo-Saxon 
unofficial leaders had. 
Speyer & Co. was the American branch of an old banking family of 
German and Jewish origins. Its leader, James Speyer, was active in 
mainly in the foreign loan business and railroads, first of all in Latin 
America. They were the first to float a Cuban loan, for example, they 
were active in Bolivian railways, and had large interests in the Mexican 
railroads parallel to domestic railroad companies. On the other hand, 
Speyer was an active philanthropist and was closely associated with the 
founding of various institutions. An ardent New Yorker, his largest 
contribution to his beloved city came in the form as the initiator and 
founder of the Museum of the City of New York, which opened in 1932. 
As recognition for this and many other activities, he was bestowed with 
the annual gold medal of the Hundred Years Association in 1938. His 
philanthropic drive was manifest not only in civic affairs. His firm was 
the first private banking house in New York to establish a pension fund 
for its employees from his own donation in 1906. Speyer also helped raise 
funds for Jewish sufferers in the First World War, mainly in Poland.
29
 
The reason why this financer was interested in providing loans to 
European countries, aside from the obvious hunger for profit, lay in his 
belief in the cooperation of the United States and Europe. As he saw, “the 
granting of credit by our banks and bankers, and the purchase of foreign 
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securities by investors [was] a practical business… It would add to our 
contribution towards European recovery.”30 Since the Europe of the mid-
1920s provided ample possibilities for investment, it is not surprising that 
Speyer & Co. had signaled more than once that they wanted to come in 
for the Hungarian loan.
31
 According to an American businessman, Speyer 
and his men were “anxious to occupy the place in any Hungarian loan that 
J. P. Morgan & Co. hold in the Austrian loan, and are preparing, they tell 
us, to underwrite $25/30,000,000 of such Hungarian loan.”32 After 
Morgan’s refusal to join the venture, Speyer & Co. may have seemed 
ideal for the vacuum that was created on the American part. There was a 
serious problem, however. The company did not enjoy popularity and was 
disliked by other banking houses and investment bankers, above all by 
John Pierpont Morgan.  
J. P. Morgan’s dislike for his business rival stemmed for various 
sources. It was one thing that Speyer was of German origin, a nation 
Morgan came to resent very much on account of World War I. Speyer’s 
close relations with Germany put him in an awkward position that caused 
some damage for the company. To make things worse, James Speyer, 
despite having been born in Manhattan, had a heavy German accent.
33
 In 
addition, Morgan made no secret about the fact that he was “not very 
enthusiastic about Jews” and he did not want to see business in their 
hands.
34
 Naturally, this trait ran in the family. His father, according to one 
of his first biographers, “had a deep-seated anti-Semitic prejudice and on 
more than one occasion needlessly antagonized great Jewish banking 
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firms.”35 The older Morgan also referred to Jacob H. Schiff, also a 
German-born Jew, head of archrival Kuehn, Loeb & Co., simply as “that 
foreigner.”36  
The younger Morgan followed his father both in his business 
practices and anti-Semitic worldview. In May 1920, for example, before 
the Lowell Plan to reduce the number of Jews at Harvard, Morgan served 
as an overseer of Harvard University. In that capacity, he felt his duty to 
alert President Lowell of the grave danger posed by a board vacancy:  
I think I ought to say that I believe there is a strong feeling among the 
Overseers that the nominee should by no means be a Jew or a Roman 
Catholic, although, naturally, the feeling in regard to the latter is less 
than in regard to the former. I am afraid you will think we are a narrow-
minded lot, but I would base my personal objection to each if these two 
for that position on the fact that in both cases there is acknowledgment 
of interests or political control beyond, and, in the minds of these people, 
superior to the Government of this country—the Jew is always a Jew 
first and an American second, and the Roman Catholic, I fear, too often a 
Papist first and an American second.
37
  
In light of these facts, it is no wonder that J. P. Morgan & Co. tried 
to oppose Speyer & Co. in any way they could. 
The feud went back quite some time. Morgan’s father declared 
already in the nineteenth century that he did not wish to see “business 
largely in the hands of Speyer & Co. & similar houses.”38 In order to see 
this achieved, he was not shy to use his status and connections when it 
came to outmaneuvering Speyer. James Speyer kept filing complaints to 
the State Department about governmental favoritism toward J. P. Morgan 
& Co. and its close collaborating banking houses, obviously to no avail.
39
 
During the Mexican debt settlement, for instance, the Morgan house made 
sure that Speyer & Co. did not have a seat on the International Committee 
of Bankers on Mexico (ICBM), presumably because of Speyer’s business 
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tactics in Mexico.
40
 With Morgan’s prestige and connections it was not 
surprising that other firms were not enthusiastic about Speyer either. The 
main London house, Rothschilds, would have been willing to work for the 
League loan in cooperation with Hallgarten, Dillon, or Chase National, 
for example, but not with Speyer & Co.
41
 In light of the fact that the 
Rothschild family was of the same German Jewish decent as the Speyers 
and was conspicuous in fighting for equal rights for Jews in Great Britain 
in the 19
th
 century and elsewhere in the 20
th
 century, their attitude makes 
one arrive at the conclusion that religious and racial ties were secondary 
to those of connections of wealth, once the opposition to one’s race was 
overcome.
42
 Jeremiah Smith, Jr., Hungary’s freshly chosen 
Commissioner-General, in all likelihood to his ties to the House of 
Morgan, also thought that the Speyer house, though not insignificant, was 
speculative and its participation was to be avoided.
43
  
Anti-Semitism reached the Speyers in Great Britain as well. James’s 
brother in London suffered more. The English Branch of the Speyers was 
forced to close down and Edgar Speyer, the head of the company, had to 
leave the country. Although on the surface it was his loyalty that was 
called into question because of his German origins, but the prevailing 
anti-Semitism joined hands with the natural German phobia during World 
War I. Edgar Speyer refused to produce a letter of loyalty and instead 
chose to renounce his title and resign his membership of the Privy 
Council, which the Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith did not accept. 
But a Scottish noble challenged Speyer’s right to the position on account 
of the latter’s not being a natural-born British citizen. Although these 
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forces failed to oust Speyer officially, the personal attacks did not cease 
and soon, he had had enough of the British atmosphere and moved to 
New York. In 1921, his naturalization was revoked and he was stripped of 
his nobility and position on account of treason during the war.
44
  
It is little wonder, then, that on neither side of the Atlantic was Speyer 
& Co. welcomed. Still, the question of the League loan was burning. Time 
seemed to run out if no one issued an American tranche. Norman realized 
that serious compromises had to be made. Although he was “viciously anti-
Semitic,” and, according to Émile Moreau, his French counterpart, he 
seemed “full of contempt for the Jews about whom he spoke in very bad 
terms,”and described Speyer & Co. only as “Jews, with great ambitions,” 
his goal to consolidate Central Europe tied closely Great Britain and the 
pound overrode other considerations.
45
 He quickly put aside whatever 
prejudices he may have had and set out to arrange the loan business that had 
many other difficulties without taking into consideration racial biases. 
As for Hungary, as was shown, even the possibility of a Jewish 
controller was a red rag. The main point seems to have been that no 
physical presence of the Jewish world be visible, that is, that the 
Commissioner-General be of non-Jewish stock. The source of the money, 
however, was a sensitive issue as well. But in the realpolitik vein Bethlen 
possessed and practiced, it was of secondary importance where the money 
came from. The main point was that Hungary should receive the loan, if 
from “clean” sources only all the better, but if some Jewish banker was 
involved that was tolerable for Hungary. Also, the Hungarian government 
knew that some of the money coming from London would arrive from the 
House of Rothschild, perhaps the most prominent banking house in 
Europe, and of Jewish origin. On March 27
th
, Bethlen submitted the 
package of the Reconstruction Bill to the National Assembly, where 
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debate was sometimes fierce in tone. Some of it concerned the person of 
the future commissioner, some the source of the money. It is enough to 
mention that during that debate, a member of the Assembly said that with 
the flotation of this loan the Jewish question would get in the limelight 
because the banks abroad that would float the loan and the majority of the 
Hungarian banks were in Jewish hands.
46
 This was naturally a half-truth, 
because at this time it was still surmised that J. P. Morgan would provide 
one-third of the loan. Bethlen faced resistance but was adamant that the 
bill go through and, with the help of the overwhelming majority of his 
party, there was no doubt about the outcome. Still, the parliamentary 
debate lasted three weeks in 16-hour sessions before the Reconstruction 
Bill was passed on April 18
th
.
47
 
Speyer, somewhat living up to the negative image others held about 
him, was bent on making the most out of the vacuum that his rival 
Morgan had left. But he was stirring waters till the very last moment in 
order to have the best deal of this loan business. On the one hand, he tried 
to secure US governmental backing for the deal. He asked the State 
Department to issue a statement saying that American bankers do intend 
to take part in the pending loan. The Department decided that such action 
would constitute a bad precedent, since it was private banks that were 
doing the lending and a statement of that nature might imply US 
government involvement, which was inconceivable. First Speyer tried to 
threaten that they would not participate if the required State Department 
statement was not made, but he did take part in the floatation of the loan 
anyway in the end.
48
 Also, before finally signing a contract, Speyer’s 
promise varied between $4.25 million and $10 million.
49
 In the end, 
shrewdly looking ahead, Speyer raised his participation to $7.5 million, 
but wanted exclusive right to do other Hungarian business in New York 
during the period of the loan, which was vehemently refused by both the 
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British and Hungarians.
50
 On June 30
th
 he signed the loan contract 
without the exclusive clause and the flotation could begin in earnest.
51
 
The Hungarian government did not seem to mind that the American 
bank was in the hand of a Jewish family, let alone that the Rothschilds 
were Jewish as well. “Money has no smell,” and all that mattered for 
Hungary was that Great Britain and especially the United States be 
represented among the lending countries. Overriding racial qualms, 
Bethlen proudly informed American readers that “Now the American 
bankers have also decided that Hungary is a good, safe investment.”52 He 
did not deal with such petit questions like Jewish sources of the money. In 
the true practical sense of Bethlen and as further proof of the Hungarian 
government conditional anti-Semitism, Speyer & Co. and Hungary had 
following business connections, and James Speyer was even honored. The 
Cabinet agreed that Speyer should be awarded a medal as recognition for 
his services to Hungary. He was decorated with the Hungarian Order of 
Merit with Stars, Class II, which he received in the United States from the 
Hungarian Minister László Széchenyi.53 This was also a sign of the 
somewhat languishing anti-Semitism in Hungary, which, unfortunately, in 
the 1930s picked up again and led to terrible consequences. 
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